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Abstract 
 
We construct key household and individual economic variables using a panel 
micro data set from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for 
1994-2005. We analyze cross-sectional income and consumption inequality and 
find that inequality decreased during the 2000-2005 economic recovery. The 
decrease appears to be driven by falling volatility of transitory income shocks. 
The response of consumption to permanent and transitory income shocks becomes 
weaker later in the sample, consistent with greater self-insurance against 
permanent shocks and greater smoothing of transitory shocks.  Comparisons of 
RLMS data with official macroeconomic statistics reveal that national accounts 
may underestimate the extent of unofficial economic activity, and that the official 
consumer price index may overstate inflation and be prone to quality bias.  
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1. Introduction 
Modern macroeconomists are increasingly relying on the analysis of environments with 
heterogeneous agents. Many macroeconomic questions can only be asked (and answered) in the 
context of multi-agent environments. These richer macroeconomic models require a 
correspondingly rich set of empirical facts that come from micro data and incorporate 
information on distributions in addition to the usual aggregates.  The goal of this paper is to 
provide a comprehensive set of cross-sectional and time series stylized facts for the Russian 
economy and a systematic study of multiple dimensions of inequality. 
Since the late 1980s, Russian economy has been subject to substantial macroeconomic 
volatility, with a long phase of severe output contraction, periods of high and variable inflation, 
and a subsequent period of recovery.  At the same time, Russia has tremendous regional 
diversity.  The combination of these factors presents unique opportunities for studying both 
cross-sectional and time-varying dimensions of inequality.  Fortunately, high quality data are 
available to explore these opportunities: a large, nationally representative panel study of Russian 
households that incorporates economic variables, the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS). 
 This paper includes multiple dimensions of inequality, with particular focus on 
consumption and income.  We construct the key variables describing the economic behavior of 
Russian households and individuals and analyze their cross-sectional dispersion and time series 
patterns.  Specifically, we create time-varying distributions of individual earnings and labor 
supply, as well as household-level income, expenditure, and consumption.   
We would like to highlight two main results.  First, almost all measures of cross-sectional 
inequality in income and consumption started falling during 2000-2005, after staying relatively 
high during 1994-1998.  Second, the measured fall in inequality is mostly due to the moderation 
of the transitory shocks to household income and consumption. 
The recent period of falling inequality was preceded by an initial rise in the early 1990s 
that accompanied Russia’s transition from a centrally planned to market economy (e.g., 
Commander et al 1999, Galbraith et al 2004).  However, the level of inequality at the end of our 
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sample is still higher than it was during the socialist era.  Interestingly, poor households do not 
appear to fall behind during the economic recovery – the lower tail of the expenditure 
distribution does not diverge from the middle as the economy expands.  The latest level of 
inequality that we find is typical for a middle income country.  For example, the Gini coefficient 
in 2005 was about 0.38-0.40, which is just slightly above the mean value of Gini coefficients for 
after-tax household income and consumption from upper middle income countries.1,2   
Some features that set the Russian economy apart from more developed countries turn 
out to be important for the analysis of inequality.  One such feature is home production of food.  
Our results indicate that home-grown food has a large equalizing effect on income and 
consumption.  The effect is large, because poorer rural households are also the ones that grow a 
lot of food for own consumption.  Another unique feature of the Russian economy is its 
geographic diversity.  Accounting for regional differences in the cost of living (that vary by a 
factor of 2.7 in Russia) is shown to have a sizeable equalizing effect.  Other important features of 
the Russian transition, such as underreporting of income, wage payment delays, irregularities in 
government transfer payments, and forced in-kind substitutes in lieu of wage payments also 
explain some of the inequality trends.   
The comparison of income and expenditure inequality reveals further differences from 
developed economies. In developed economies, expenditures are usually distributed more 
equally than income, which is attributed to consumption smoothing possibilities.  This turns out 
not to be the case for Russia, where expenditure inequality is almost as high as income 
inequality.  We argue that the relatively high expenditure inequality reflected peculiar patterns of 
consumption smoothing during the downturn.  Households facing irregular wage and transfer 
                                                 
1 Our results on inequality levels have to be taken in the context of our sample. We think that the RLMS, like most 
household surveys, may under-represent the very rich individuals who own capital assets in Russia.  This is evident 
from the negligible financial asset holdings of most RLMS respondents.  The studies that attempt to adjust for super-
rich typically document much higher levels of inequality.  For example, Guriev and Rachinsky (2006) find that the 
income Gini coefficient for the city of Moscow is 0.625, and Aivazian and Kolenikov (2001) report a Gini 
coefficient of 0.55-0.57 based on parametric estimation of the uncensored expenditure distribution.  We find some 
evidence that suggests divergence between the super-rich and the rest of the population in 2003-2005 (see Section 2 
for further discussion).   
2 The comparisons are made using the Inequality Database of the World Institute for Development Economics 
Research.   
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payments, high inflation, and undeveloped financial markets used less conventional mechanisms 
such as food storage to smooth consumption.  Food inventories were built up when income was 
received to insure against irregular wage payments.   
We further look at the inequality dynamics between groups in our sample.  We find the 
comparison of economic experience between urban and rural populations is particularly 
interesting.  The rural population has a more restricted choice of jobs, which limits occupational 
mobility during transition.  In addition, the workers with highest earnings potential might have 
migrated to cities.  However, we do not find evidence that income and consumption of the rural 
population fell behind.  The rural group did not seem to do relatively worse during the downturn, 
although during the recovery the rural population exhibited a slower growth rate in consumption 
of durables.  
More broadly, we have found almost no evidence of convergence or divergence between 
groups based on observables, such as education, location, household composition, and age.  The 
reduction in inequality during economic recovery resulted mostly from the moderation in the 
residual volatility of income and consumption growth.  
We examine the reasons for the observed fall in residual income volatility by exploiting 
the panel dimensions of the data.  In particular, we decompose the income process into 
permanent and transitory components and estimate their effect on consumption.  We document 
that the fall in residual income volatility is mostly due to a fall in the variance of transitory 
income shocks.3  Over time, consumption response to both permanent and transitory income 
components becomes weaker.  This is consistent with better insurance against income shocks and 
hence better consumption smoothing later in the mid 2000s. 
Apart from the analysis of inequality trends, we examine the trends in the levels of 
income and expenditure.  The time trends show a 40 percent drop in real per-capita expenditure 
and a 50 percent drop in real hourly wages during 1994-1998.  Recent literature has argued that 
the drop in Russian real output during the transition has been overstated due to exaggeration of 
the Soviet output and mismeasurement of the unofficial economy in the 1990s (Schleifer and 
                                                 
3 Stillman (2001) finds that RLMS expenditures respond strongly to transitory shocks during 1994-1998. 
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Treisman 2005) or due to overstatement of inflation by the official CPI (Gibson et al 2004).  To 
detect possible sources of CPI bias, we examine food prices and quantities from RLMS and find 
that the composition of food consumption has not changed much. Consequently, the CPI 
substitution bias within the food category is likely to be small.  We do find, however, substantial 
disagreement in food CPI between RLMS and National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), 
with a 25 percent discrepancy in the cumulative inflation during 1994-1998, but not much 
discrepancy afterwards.  In addition, there is evidence of quality bias in the official CPI.   
The paper’s goal of documenting a comprehensive set of macroeconomic facts for Russia 
links it to many bodies of literature in macroeconomics, labor economics, development 
economics, and transition economics.  In the interest of space, the literature survey below is 
necessarily incomplete, and it merely catalogues some of the related recent work by topic.  Our 
analysis is closely related to the growing empirical literature that analyzes the joint evolution of 
income and consumption distributions (Cutler and Katz 1992, Attanasio and Davis 1996, 
Blundell and Preston 1998, Slesnick 2001, Krueger and Perri 2006, Heathcote et al 2007, 
Blundell et al 2008, etc.).  There is also a growing body of research on inequality in developing 
countries. We find this literature particularly relevant for our study as it emphasizes the 
importance of measurement issues, urban-rural differences, home production, and income 
underreporting in understanding inequality in developing countries (e.g., Chen and Ravallion 
1996, Deaton 1997).  
Several papers document changes in income inequality in Russia in the 1990s.  These 
studies establish a number of important facts for the early transition period: rising income 
inequality, significant income mobility, large regional variation, and insufficient government 
transfers to offset an increase in wage inequality (Commander et al 1999; Milanovic 1999; 
Flemming and Micklewright 2000).  The rise in income inequality is mainly attributed to 
compositional shifts from the old state sector to the new private sector, liberalization of wage 
setting, liberalization of prices and trade, and macroeconomic volatility.  Some studies argue in 
favor of inequality measures based on expenditures (Aivazyan and Kolennikov 1999, Jovanovic 
2001).  They find a significant share of the transitory component in shocks to expenditures, high 
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instability, and a slight downward trend in expenditure-based inequality.  Our findings are in 
general agreement with these studies.  We extend previous analyses in a number of ways.  We 
consider a longer time span covering recent years, provide a variety of measures and 
decompositions of inequality, investigate sources of inequality, and examine the co-movements 
between income and consumption using the panel aspects of the data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the data, provide 
basic information on the levels of consumption, income and labor market participation, and 
compare these statistics with official data.  In Section 3, we document the trends in inequality in 
individual labor market outcomes over 1994-2005.  In Section 4, we construct and report 
consistent time series for a variety of measures of consumption and income inequality at the 
household level.  Section 5 decomposes the income process into transitory and permanent 
components and investigates the interaction of consumption and income inequality at the 
household level.  In Section 6, we examine the role of regional disparities and dispersion of 
prices in generating inequality and discuss the possible sources of CPI bias.  Our concluding 
remarks are in Section 7.  
2. Data Overview 
Sample and variables 
 The analysis in this paper uses the RLMS, which is a panel dataset that includes detailed 
information on measures of income, consumption, household demographics, and labor supply.  
The RLMS is organized by the Population Center at the University of North Carolina in 
cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sociology.  The data are collected annually, and our 
panel includes 10 waves during the period 1994-2005, with the exception of 1997 and 1999, 
when the survey was not administered.4  There were approximately 8,343-10,670 individuals 
who completed the adult (age 14 and over) questionnaire and 3,750-4,718 households who 
                                                 
4 In all plots except Figure 2, the 1997 and 1999 values are 2 point linear interpolations of the data points in adjacent 
years. 
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completed the household questionnaire in each round.  These individuals and households reside 
in 32 oblasts (regions) and 7 federal districts of the Russian Federation.5 
The RLMS sample is a multi-stage probability sample of dwellings.  The response rate is 
relatively high: it exceeds 80% for households and about 97 percent for individuals within the 
households.  The sample attrition is generally low compared to similar panel surveys in other 
countries, partly owing to lower mobility and infrequent changes of residences.6  To account for 
the panel attrition, all statistics reported in this study are weighted using the RLMS sample 
weights that adjust not only for sample design factors but also for deviations from the census 
characteristics.  For comparability with other countries in this volume, we restrict our estimation 
sample to households in which at least one individual is 25-60 years old.  Appendix 3 shows the 
size and composition of the estimation sample. 
The variables employed in our study are carefully constructed and made not only 
internally comparable across different waves but also externally consistent with standard variable 
definitions in macroeconomic literature.  We provide thorough treatment of missing values, 
influential observations, non-response, and other common problems of micro data.  We also take 
into account important Russia-specific phenomena that influence our variable definition and data 
analysis such as wage payment delays in the 1990s, production of food at home, high regional 
diversity in cost of living, as well as peculiarities of the transition to a market economy.  The 
detailed procedures of variable construction are documented in Appendix 1.   
Economic conditions 
Economic conditions in Russia affect our interpretation of income and consumption data 
in important ways.  During the 1994-2005 period, Russia continued its transformation from a 
centrally planned system into a market economy.  New integrated markets have emerged and 
new institutions of private ownership and property rights have been established.   
                                                 
5 Russia had 89 regions and 7 federal districts as of December 1, 2005.  The RLMS sample consists of 38 randomly 
selected primary sample units (municipalities) that are representative of the whole country. 
6 To deal with attrition, RLMS replenishes its sample on a regular basis by adding new dwellings, especially in the 
areas of high mobility such as Moscow and other large cities.  To maintain the panel, RLMS partially attempts to 
collect information on those who moved out of the sample dwellings but live in the same location.  More details on 
sample design, attrition, and replenishment are available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms.  
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This transition to a market economy was accompanied by extreme macroeconomic 
disturbances, both real and nominal.  Our sample period features two distinct phases: the 
downturn in 1994-1998 and the post-1998 period of rapid recovery.  Panel A of Figure 1 shows 
that the early 1990s, following price liberalization in 1992, was a period of hyper-inflation.  The 
end-year inflation rate in 1994 was 214 percent.  The 1998 inflation spike (84 percent) 
corresponds to the government default on sovereign debt and the abrupt devaluation of the 
national currency, the ruble.  In the downturn, real per-capita income and expenditures fell by 
about 40 percent (see panels B-D).  Employee compensation and public transfers were paid 
irregularly, and were delayed by 3 to 5 months, on average.  In the recovery phase, real per-
capita income and expenditure growth was around 9 percent annually, and inflation stayed 
relatively low (10 to 20 percent).  
Composition of income  
The composition of household income during the sample period remained relatively 
stable, although there are important differences with Western industrialized economies.  Panel B 
of Figure 1 compares four different measures of household after-tax monthly income during 
1994-2005: (1) yL = labor income, (2) yL+ = net private transfers + yL, (3) y = capital income + 
yL+, and (4) yD = public transfers + y.  Labor income, yL, is by far the largest income source; it 
accounts for 82 percent of household after-tax disposable income, yD, on average.  In addition to 
labor income, yD includes income derived from financial assets, net private transfers, and public 
transfers.  Income derived from financial assets is negligible; there is only a tiny difference 
between y and yL+.  Net private transfers are contributions in money and in kind received from 
friends, relatives, and charitable organizations minus contributions given to individuals outside 
the household unit.  Although net private transfers should not (and do not) affect average 
disposable income (the gap between yL+ and yL is negligible), gross private transfers are 
significant: private transfers received amount to 9 percent of disposable income, making them a 
potentially important channel of risk-sharing.  Average public transfers are also large and amount 
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to 13 percent of disposable income.  The share of public transfers has increased after 2001, as 
evidenced by the growing gap between yD and y in panel B. 
Composition of expenditures 
Household consumption is constructed from numerous disaggregated categories of 
expenditures.  Non-durable items, c, include 50 subcategories of food at home and away from 
home, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, expenses on clothing and 
footwear, gasoline and other fuel expenses, rents and utilities, and 15-20 subcategories of 
services such as transportation, repair, health care services, education, entertainment, recreation, 
insurance, etc. Durable consumption is based on purchases of durable items within the last 3 
months.  All consumption measures are converted to a monthly base.  To keep the coverage of 
consumption consistent across years, we exclude expenditure categories that became available 
only in recent years, such as washing supplies, personal hygiene items, books, sporting 
equipment, internet, and wireless phone services.7 
Food is the biggest expenditure category for most households. The share of food 
purchases in aggregate non-durable expenditures starts from a high of nearly 70 percent in 1994 
and gradually falls to 49 percent in 2005 (see also Figure 1C).  One peculiar feature of Russian 
households is that many of them grow agricultural products on their subsidiary plots for own 
consumption.  In 1994, about 10 percent of total food consumption (by market value) was home-
grown, and by 2005 the share of food grown at home fell to 5 percent (see also Figure 1C).  
Despite declining in aggregate importance, home production of food significantly affects 
measures of inequality, because it is concentrated among the poorer rural households (see 
Section 4). 
The share of durables was around 14 percent of aggregate expenditures, cD, during 1994-
2002, but has increased significantly after 2003 (see also Figure 1D).  Expenditures on durables 
                                                 
7 The share of excluded expenditure categories is about 3% of total consumption expenditures in 2001-2004 and 5% 
in 2005. The 2 percentage point increase in 2005 is explained by adding expenditures on internet and cell phones in 
the 2005 RLMS questionnaire.  The omitted expenditure categories do not affect the measures of consumption 
inequality. 
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tend to be concentrated at high income levels.  76 percent of households report no durable 
purchases within the last 3 months.   
For 2000-2005, our dataset has a self-reported market value of owner-occupied housing.  
If we take the annual housing services flow to be 5 percent of its market value, the share of 
owner-occupied housing will equal roughly 11 percent of total consumption, cD+.  The share of 
housing consumption is relatively stable over time because the aggregate market value of 
housing is growing at roughly the same rate as aggregate expenditures, cD (see Figure 1D). 
Income underreporting  
Two data facts lead us to believe that the aggregate income obtained from RLMS is likely 
to be underestimated.  The first fact is the negligible share of capital income.  This could be due 
to income underreporting but also due to the underrepresentation of the very rich individuals in 
the RLMS.  To get a sense of the underestimated capital income, we can take the estimate of 
personal wealth of Russian billionaires and millionaires (1.4 times national GDP) from Guriev 
and Rachinsky (2006) and multiply it by a conservative rate of return on wealth (6 percent).  If 
this is correct, the super-rich should earn about 8.4 percent of GDP, which we miss in our data. 
The second fact is that for those who are in the sample, expenditures are consistently 
above reported income throughout the whole period (Figure 1D).  This gap cannot be attributed 
to dissaving, as most households have negligible stocks of financial assets.  We believe that 
income is under-reported because of tax evasion.  For example, Gorodnichenko et al (2009) 
studied the gap between consumption and income in the RLMS data set and found the gap to be 
significantly larger in districts where respondents believed that other people do not pay their 
taxes.  Over time, the gap between consumption and income seems to narrow, and the narrower 
gap may correspond to the effect of the 2001 tax reform, credit market development, and other 
factors (see Gorodnichenko et al 2009). 
Since we do not have an independent estimate of the extent of income under-reporting 
(except the consumption-income gap itself), it seems to be more informative to compare 
expenditure, rather than income, levels between RLMS and other data sources.  
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Comparison with national accounts 
We first compare income and expenditure levels between RLMS and official National 
Income and Products Accounts (NIPA).  To make comparisons with national statistics, one must 
be careful about using compatible data definitions.  The RLMS measure of household disposable 
income (yD) is after taxes and transfers given, and it excludes in-kind consumption, such as 
owner-occupied housing and home-grown food.  The corresponding NIPA measure is disposable 
income for the “household account” after taxes and transfers minus in-kind consumption 
(Goskomstat 2007a).  Similarly, the RLMS measure of consumption that we select for 
comparison purposes (cD) corresponds to the NIPA measure of household final consumption 
expenditures on durable and non-durable goods and services without imputed in-kind 
expenditures (Goskomstat 2007a).  For comparability purposes, we use the full unrestricted 
sample. 
Panels A and B of Figure 2 compare yD and cD (in per capita terms) with their 
counterparts from NIPA.  Consumer expenditures in RLMS and NIPA are close during most of 
the sample period8, while reported disposable income in RLMS is up to 30 percent lower than 
the official figures.  The big discrepancy in income levels across the two sources is expected, 
since NIPA expenditure and income data are internally consistent and adjusted for under-
reporting,9 and RLMS reported income is much lower than expenditures.  This comparison 
supports income under-reporting as a possible explanation for the consumption-income gap in 
the RLMS and also points to expenditure data as potentially more informative about the level 
variables.  
The close agreement between RLMS and NIPA expenditure numbers in panel B contrasts 
sharply with similar comparisons for the U.S. where household surveys tend to underestimate 
national aggregates by more than 30 percent.  The analogous comparisons for the UK produce a 
                                                 
8 The 1998 discrepancy can be explained by the fact that RLMS has been conducted just right after the August 
financial crisis while NIPA’s numbers are averaged over the year. 
9 NIPA eliminates the discrepancy between reported income and consumption by construction.  Disposable income 
is constructed as a sum of household aggregate expenditures and savings, and the difference between imputed 
disposable income and the officially reported income is included in the income accounts as unobserved labor 
compensation.   
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less significant discrepancy of 5 percent (Attanasio et al 2004).  Our finding is somewhat 
surprising, since RLMS likely under-represents the very rich households that consume out of 
capital income.  However, it is possible that that the official statistics make an insufficient 
adjustment for shadow economic activity, so the discrepancy between NIPA and RLMS 
expenditures is not as large as one may have expected. 
Starting in 2003, RLMS consumption expenditures show slower growth than NIPA 
expenditures.  As explained above, this difference in trends may indicate the growing gap 
between the RLMS sample and the super-rich individuals.  Part of the gap may also be due to an 
upward trend in consumption of goods that RLMS data does not consistently track, such as 
internet and cell phone services.  However, new consumption categories added to RLMS over 
the years account for at most 5 percent of aggregate expenditures, and their growth is not enough 
to account for the difference in trends after 2003.  Finally, a small portion of the gap (up to 1.6 
percent of aggregate expenditures per capita) can be explained by the replacement of one of the 
wealthiest oil-based regions in the North by the middle income region in Siberia in the 2003 
RLMS sample (this was the only episode of regional sample replacement during the 1994-2005 
period).   
Comparison with the Household Budget Survey 
We also compare RLMS with another official data source, the Household Budget Survey 
(HBS).  HBS is the core Goskomstat source for published statistics on income differentiation and 
the composition of income and consumption.  The HBS micro files are not publicly available.  It 
is worthy of note that Goskomstat does not publish the actual income levels from HBS possibly 
for the reasons of massive under-reporting.  Instead, it imputes money income as the sum of 
household expenditures and changes in financial assets (Goskomstat 1999). 
Panels C and D of Figure 2 show the trends in consumption of food (including food 
grown at home) and non-food items, respectively.  The statistics reported in Panels C and D are 
the average monthly consumption expenditures per household member.  The RLMS expenditures 
are about 20 percent higher than its HBS counterpart, with the discrepancy being larger for non-
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food items.  Some of the discrepancy is due to RLMS survey timing: the HBS reports average 
monthly consumption in a given year while RLMS reports last month consumption at the end of 
year.  Then RLMS numbers should be larger when there is an upward trend in consumption and 
smaller when there is a downward trend.  It is also plausible that consumer expenditures in HBS 
are underreported if people are reluctant to reveal their actual level of well-being in an official 
survey that asks, among other expenditures, the amount of taxes paid (RLMS does not ask about 
taxes, nor is it linked to any government agency). 
Overall, RLMS appears to be a reliable data source for examining the inequality trends in 
labor market outcomes, reported income, consumption, with the common caveats of income 
underreporting and underrepresentation of the super-rich.   
 
3. Inequality in Labor Market Outcomes 
Since labor income is the most prevalent income source, the inequality in labor market 
outcomes is crucial for understanding the overall income inequality.  This section takes a closer 
look at the dynamics of inequality in individual wages and labor supply, emphasizing the key 
differences between major population groups.     
Aggregate labor market trends 
We start with an overview of aggregate trends in wages and employment.  Several studies 
observed that during the downturn period in Russia, the decline in employment and hours of 
work was small while the wage decline was large relative to the output decline, in contrast to 
Central and Eastern European transition economies (Boeri and Terrell 2002, World Bank 2002).  
We find that the post-1998 economic growth was also accompanied by significant wage 
adjustments and relatively small changes in employment and working hours. 
Hourly real wage level experienced dramatic movements, down 48 percent, or 10 percent 
per year, during the downturn and up 87 percent, or 9 percent per year, during the recovery 
(Figure 3A).  Panel A of Figure 3 shows actual hourly wage, defined as the ratio of actual labor 
earnings received last month from all regular jobs to actual hours worked, and compares it to 
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contractual hourly wage (available 1998-2005), which is the ratio of average monthly labor 
earnings in the last 12 months to usual hours of work per month.  The actual wage is higher than 
contractual wage, partly because actual hours are lower.  Male wages appear to be more 
responsive to output fluctuations: male wages declined faster in downturn, but they also grew 
more rapidly in recovery. 
In contrast to wages, hours of work do not vary considerably over time (Figure 3B).  
Even in the downturn, an average employed person worked more than 40 hours per week.  The 
response of hours to the 1998 financial crisis was minimal.  Usual hours of work are relatively 
high (48 hours in all jobs for males), and they are bigger than actual hours because of temporary 
absence from work due to illness, vacation, maternity leave, involuntary unpaid leave, and other 
reasons.  Females typically work 5-6 hours less per week than males.  The share of full-time 
workers does not change much in response to output fluctuations: it increases slightly over time 
for both genders, with a somewhat larger overall rise for females during 1994-2005 (Figure 3C). 
Employment-to-population ratio in Russia is high by international standards.  However, it 
declined significantly for males from 94-96 percent in 1985-1990 to 86 percent in 1994, and then 
down to 79 percent in 1998 (RLMS 2000, retrospective questions).  In the growth period, the 
ratio did not revert to pre-crisis levels and stayed relatively constant at 83-84 percent for 25-59 
age group (Figure 3D).  On average, the employment rate for females is 8 percentage points 
lower than that for males, which is a smaller gender gap compared to 14 percentage points in the 
U.S. for the same age group (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006).  Figure 3D also shows that 
the official employment rate is lower than that in RLMS in the 1990s, but the difference between 
the two data sources vanishes in later years.  
Earnings and wage inequality  
Our sample starts in 1994, in the middle of an economic contraction in Russia that lasted 
almost a decade.  Available evidence suggests that earnings inequality increased in the years 
preceding our sample period.  This increase was associated with the transition to a market 
economy (Commander et al 1999).  We estimate that the Gini coefficient for earnings increased 
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from 0.28 in 1985 and 0.32 in 1990 to 0.48 in 1995 (RLMS 2000, retrospective questions).10  
The 90/50 ratio climbed from 2.2 in 1990 to 3 in 1995, while the 50/10 ratio rocketed from 2 to 4 
in just five years.   
During our sample period, however, wage inequality ceased to grow, as can be seen in 
Figure 4.  This figure compares four different measures of inequality for individual earnings and 
hourly wages, both actual and contractual, in 1994-2005.11  Actual earnings received last month 
are much more variable than contractual earnings.  Part of the reason is delayed wage payments, 
which were a major phenomenon during 1994-1998.12  Wage arrears tend to exaggerate earnings 
inequality.  For example, some workers in the sample may have received several months of back 
pay and others received no pay in the reference month, generating income dispersion that is 
higher than dispersion in annual incomes.  At the peak of wage arrears in late 1998, 62 percent of 
Russian workers reported overdue wages averaging 4.8 monthly salaries per affected worker 
(Earle and Sabirianova Peter, forthcoming).  Consequently, the difference in actual and 
contractual earnings inequality was the largest in 1996-1998.  Wage arrears subsided in later 
years, although they did not disappear entirely: about 12 percent of all employees reported delays 
in wage payments in 2005.  Because of this, and also due to seasonal and irregular employment, 
actual earnings still show higher inequality than contractual earnings in later years.  In Figure 4, 
measures of inequality for hourly wages and earnings are close because of low dispersion of 
working hours. 
                                                 
10 This dynamics of the Gini coefficient is consistent with other studies.  For example, Flemming and Micklewright 
(2000) report an increase in the Gini coefficient for per capita income from 0.27 in 1989 to 0.41 in 1994 based on 
the Household Budget Survey.  They note, however, that inequality could have been larger in the Soviet period after 
accounting for significant in-kind subsidies (e.g., free housing).  
11 The observations on contractual earnings are available starting in 1998.  For 1994-1996, we construct contractual 
earnings from the data on actual earnings and answers to questions about accumulated overdue wage amount and 
number of months of overdue pay, according to the method proposed by Earle and Sabirianova (2002).  See 
Appendix 1 for details. 
12 Other reasons for excessive volatility of actual earnings in 1994-1998 include widespread temporary layoffs in the 
form of unpaid involuntary leaves and forced in-kind payments in lieu of wages owed.  The use of involuntary leave 
peaked in 1996, when 15.8 percent of employees had average leave duration of about eight weeks.  In-kind 
substitutes for money wages peaked in 1998, with 15.4 percent of workers affected (World Bank 2002).  Adding 
these forced substitutes to actual earnings extends the bottom of the distribution of positive last-month income 
receipts and thus increases the overall dispersion.  
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According to most measures in Figure 4, inequality in wages and individual earnings has 
been declining over the sample period.  The Gini coefficient for contractual earnings declined 
from 0.48 in 1995 to 0.41 in 2005 and the variance of logs decreased by 0.17.  The decline in 
earnings inequality is more pronounced in the bottom half of earnings distribution: while the 
90/50 ratio hardly changed over the sample period, the 50/10 ratio fell sizably from 4 to 2.5.   
It may seem unusual that inequality at the bottom of the distribution was declining during 
an economic contraction.  One explanation is that the timing of contraction (that started around at 
least as early as 1991) differed by income groups: for example, the dramatic rise in 50-10 ratio 
prior to our sample period suggests that low income workers suffered the most during the first 
years of market reforms. Several factors may have contributed to the decline in earnings 
inequality at the bottom of the distribution that continued after 1998: oil-driven growth that 
created labor demand in low-skill industries such as mining and construction, enhanced 
competition for workers (e.g., the number of employers increased dramatically), improved 
compensation in the public sector, etc.; each of these factors deserve a separate study.  
Although the inequality indices remained higher than their pre-transition levels, the 
overall inequality decline is quite remarkable, and the reasons for it merit further research in the 
future.  This trend is consistent with international macroeconomic data showing a negative 
contemporaneous correlation between income inequality and economic growth for less 
developed countries (Barro 2000). 
Many Russians may be surprised to find that inequality has declined given the emergence 
of the conspicuous wealthy elite and a popular belief in the rising gap between rich and poor.  
We note, however, that adding the super-rich to the RLMS data will not affect the Kuznets ratios 
in Figure 4.  There still might be a valid concern that upwardly mobile high earners may have 
left the addresses surveyed by the RLMS interviewers, and that those who stayed are self-
selected low earners.  Some of the issues with panel attrition are addressed within the survey 
itself by adding new dwellings to the sample and adjusting the sample weights.13  The fact that 
                                                 
13 To assess the importance of non-random exit from the survey on the measures of inequality, we re-weighted 
observations by giving a larger weight to observations with a higher probability of exit.  The adjusted weight is 
calculated as L.weight × 1/(1- Pexit), where L.weight is the sample weight from the previous round and Pexit is the 
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our sample is unlikely to be skewed towards poor is also supported by the RLMS aggregate 
expenditure levels that are close to NIPA and exceed the HBS levels reported in Section 2. 
Wage premia  
The analysis of between-group wage inequality reveals several interesting results.  They 
are reported in Figure 5 that shows aggregate trends in wage premium associated with education, 
gender, and experience.  The male education (college/non-college) premium is substantial (about 
50 percent on average), although it is smaller than the current education premium in the U.S. 
(e.g., Autor et al 2008, Eckstein and Nagypal 2004).  The education premium has been rising 
since 1995 but dropped after 2002. 
The gender premium in monthly earnings is large (up to 69 percent in 2000), even though 
it declined to 51 percent in recent years.  The gender differences in hourly wages are smaller (35-
47 percent) due to fewer hours of work by females.  The level is comparable to the U.S. gender 
premium in the 1970s (e.g., Blau and Kahn 2000). 
Remarkably, the male experience premium is negative, and it is below the female 
experience premium (Figure 5C).  The age-earnings profile reaches its peak at age 33 for males 
(44 for females), whereas male earnings growth in the U.S. continues until much later ages (e.g., 
Heckman et al 2008).  This unusual earnings profile may be partly attributed to the obsolescence 
of skills of Soviet-era workers.14  However, if obsolete skills were the sole driving force of the 
negative experience premium, one would expect the experience premium to be low at first and to 
rise gradually over time as the old-era workers move out of the labor force.  In fact, the male 
experience premium stays negative and roughly constant throughout the sample period.  Another 
explanation for this result is that dramatic economic changes during both contraction and growth 
periods generated a wage premium for younger workers because they are more mobile and more 
                                                                                                                                                             
probability of exit from the survey estimated from a flexible probit regression that includes a wide range of controls 
for individual characteristics. We found that adjustment for non-random exit barely changes the magnitude and the 
trend slope of earnings inequality. 
14 Consistent with this, Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2008) find evidence of a big shift in life satisfaction by cohort: 
individuals who finished their education just before the transition report much lower life satisfaction than similar 
individuals who finished their education just after. This jump in life satisfaction could, perhaps, reflect brighter 
lifetime earnings prospects of workers educated under the new regime. 
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adaptive.  We also think that deteriorating health, particularly for males, could be a contributory 
factor to the negative experience premium.  The life expectancy of Russian males has dropped by 
6.6 years, from 64.2 to 57.6, in just five years prior to 1994 (Brainerd and Cutler 2005).  To the 
extent that this signals deteriorating health of males in their 50s, the “physical decay” of human 
capital could drag down the experience premium.  
The residual inequality trends down over time, which is expected since the overall 
inequality is declining while the various wage premia for observable characteristics stay roughly 
constant (Figure 5D).  By way of comparison, the residual wage inequality has an upward trend 
in the U.S. (e.g., Autor 2008, Lemieux 2006). 
Gender differences in labor market outcomes 
Figure 6 presents gender comparisons of inequality in hourly wages and hours worked.  
Wage inequality is higher among males than females, which is found in the U.S. data too (e.g., 
Eckstein and Nagypal 2004).  Measures of wage inequality for both genders trend down over 
time, although the decline in inequality is more pronounced for males (this is again consistent 
with a higher responsiveness of male wages to output fluctuations).  Consequently, the 
differences in wage inequality between genders become less noticeable by the end of the sample 
period (Figure 6A).  Contractual wages show less dispersion than actual wages for both genders.   
Hours worked are considerably less variable than wages (note that panels A and B have 
different scale).  Females have slightly more variable hours, perhaps due to higher prevalence of 
part-time work.  Dispersion of hours falls during 1994-1996 and stays stable afterwards. 
The bottom two panels of Figure 6 show the correlations between hours and wages for 
males and females.  These correlations are negative for both genders, which is probably due to a 
downward bias induced by a measurement error in hours, known as “division bias” (Borjas 
1980).  There is no clear time trend in the correlation between wages and hours for either gender. 
Overall, the observed group differences in labor market outcomes behave in expected 
ways, with the exception of the negative male experience premium.  We now turn to the analysis 
of inequality across households.  
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4. Inequality in Household Income and Consumption 
This section analyzes the aggregate trends in income and consumption inequality at the 
household level.  We first examine inequality in household labor earnings and then show the 
contributions to inequality from financial income, private transfers, government transfers, and 
home production.  We also compare income inequality to consumption inequality and discuss 
possible reasons for the observed differences.   
Inequality in household labor earnings 
The RLMS data have several sources of information on household labor earnings.  Our 
preferred measure of labor earnings, yL, is aggregated from individual responses on after-tax 
contractual labor earnings (see Appendix 1 for details).  We note that Russian households are 
rather large and often include multiple generations of adults and extended family.  The average 
number of adult members (14+) is 2.6, and it is not rare for a household to have more than two 
earners (see Appendix 3 for the sample composition of households).  In this case one needs to be 
particularly careful when aggregating individual responses to the household level and should 
adjust for non-response.15  However, since the RLMS response rate within the household is fairly 
high (about 97%), this adjustment does not affect the mean and the variance of labor earnings 
(e.g., compare yLc and yL in Figure 7A).  Figure 7A shows that over time, the dispersion (var-
log) in total contractual earnings across households is trending downward.   
Another measure plotted in Figure 7A is the variance of the logarithm (var-log) of 
household actual labor earnings received last month (yLa).  These earnings are reported on 
behalf of all household members by the reference person.  While contractual earnings are 
monetary, actual earnings also contain non-monetary compensation (including forced in-kind 
substitutes for cash payments) that may introduce additional variability to household earnings.  
The dispersion in actual labor earnings has been declining after 1998, but its magnitude is 
considerably higher in comparison to contractual earnings, especially in the second half of the 
1990s.  As Figure 7B exhibits, the 1996-1998 period have the largest share of working 
                                                 
15 We impute labor earnings for non-respondents using their demographic characteristics known from the roster files 
and location. 
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households affected by wage arrears (67-68 percent) and forced in-kind substitutions of 
payments (17-20 percent), which are the two most likely contributors to high earnings volatility 
(see also footnote 9).  By 2005, the difference in dispersion between actual and contractual 
earnings reduces significantly, but it does not disappear entirely, possibly due to a measurement 
bias of one-person reporting, irregular employment, and residual wage arrears.   
The variance of the log of labor earnings can be decomposed into parts accounted for by 
observable components based on the following regression: 
0 1 2 3ln( ) ( )
H L E
ht t t ht t ht t ht t ht htyL D D D f a uβ β β β= + + + + + ,                                  (1) 
where yLht is contractual labor earnings of household h in year t, t0β is year-specific intercept, 
H
htD is a set of dummies for household composition (e.g., categories for size, number of children, 
and number of seniors), LhtD  is a vector of location characteristics such as an urban dummy, a 
dummy for Moscow and St. Petersburg, and 7 dummies for federal districts, EhtD denotes a set of 
dummies for educational attainment of the head of household, ( )t htf a  is a quartic polynomial in 
age of household head, and uht is the error term (see Appendix 1 for details on how these 
components are constructed).  The equation is estimated separately for each year.  The 
observables explain a significant portion of inequality; however, the residual inequality remains 
large (46-62 percent, as shown in Figure 7C).  The relative magnitude of residual inequality is 
similar to the one in developed countries.  Figure 7D plots the contributions of observable 
components to the overall dispersion of household labor earnings.  Location and household 
composition factors contribute the most to the observed inequality; education contributes some 
but age contributes close to zero.  Because of its importance for inequality in Russia, we will 
consider the effect of location on inequality in more detail in Section 6. 
Comparisons of earnings inequality trends for individuals and households 
It is informative to compare the dispersion of earnings at the individual level (ec on 
Figure 4A) and the household level (yLc on Figure 7A).  In general, one would expect the 
distribution of household earnings to differ from the distribution of individual earnings due to the 
presence of multi-generational, multi-earner households.  In RLMS, 56 percent of working 
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households have more than one earner, and over 10 percent of working households have three 
earners or more.  The resulting distribution of household earnings is strongly correlated with the 
number of earners in the household.  For example, 85 percent of households in the lowest per 
capita earnings quintile are single-earner, while 27 percent of households in the highest per 
capita earnings quintile have three earners or more.   
The dispersion of yLc is larger than the dispersion of ec throughout the whole period.   
Since secondary earners have virtually the same earnings dispersion as primary earners, the 
larger dispersion of household earnings implies the positive correlation in earnings levels among 
household members. The trends in household and individual inequality are also different: 
individual earnings inequality falls more rapidly after 2000 than household earnings inequality.  
The divergence in inequality trends between individual earnings and household earnings appears 
to be driven by the increased covariance between earnings of household members.  At the same 
time, the share of multi-earner households in the sample does not change over time.  The average 
income share of secondary earners in household labor income also stays stable.  
Inequality in equivalized labor earnings 
To account for the effect of household size on earnings inequality, we compute the 
equivalized household labor earnings, yLe, using the OECD equivalence scale.16  The dispersion 
for log equivalized earnings is almost the same as raw dispersion because equivalized earnings 
are negatively correlated with household size (Figure 7C).  Figure 8 presents several alternative 
measures of inequality in household labor earnings per adult equivalent.  Similar to Figure 7C, 
the Gini coefficient and both Kuznets ratios for household equivalized earnings exhibit a 
downward trend in the recovery period and show rapid convergence in inequality between the 
actual and contractual measures of labor earnings after 1998.  As explained above, the downward 
trend in household earnings inequality is less pronounced than the downward trend for individual 
earnings inequality.  
                                                 
16 The OECD equivalence scale assigns a value of 1.0 to the head of the household, a value of 0.7 to each additional 
adult (17+), and a value of 0.5 to each child. 
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From wages to disposable income 
Using the variance of the log, we analyze how income inequality changes as we add 
different components of household income.  Figure 9A shows that the magnitude of dispersion 
and its trend hardly change as we move from hourly to monthly contractual earnings of 
household head.  However, the earnings dispersion increases when we add earnings of other 
household members (yL).  Again, we observe that inequality in household labor earnings falls 
more slowly after 2000 than inequality in individual labor earnings.   
Taking household labor earnings as the base, we add income from other sources one at a 
time and report the corresponding inequality trend in panels B and C of Figure 9.  For 
comparability purposes, all time series in Figure 9 are calculated on a consistent sample of 
working households with non-zero contractual earnings.  Net private transfers further increase 
the dispersion of earnings throughout the whole period (the yL+ line in panel B is above the yL 
line), conceivably, because they are made irregularly.17  Income derived from financial assets is 
negligible for most households, which is why financial income has virtually no effect on 
inequality.  Government transfers, on the other hand, play a significant role in reducing income 
inequality, especially after 1998 (see yD line in panel B).  The spike in income inequality in 1996 
could be explained by unusually high pension arrears and unemployment benefit arrears in that 
year.  Having income from subsidiary farming at home (which includes both own consumption 
valued at market prices and sales of home grown food) also has a large equalizing effect on 
earnings distribution, as evidenced in panel C.18 
The dispersion of disposable income of working families with one or more wage earners 
exhibits a downward trend since 1996.  However, adding non-working families (about 11% of 
the sample) not only shifts the overall income inequality up but also alters the time trend (see 
Figure 9D).  This is because non-working families whose income consists of small private or 
                                                 
17 The correlation between net private transfers and household labor earnings is -0.14, suggesting that that more 
affluent households are likely to support other households, while not-so-affluent families are likely to receive 
support from others.  However, unlike public transfers, sporadic lump-sum private contributions may cause sizeable 
movements in the resources available to households, which raise our measures of income inequality.  In our view, 
private transfers would probably decrease inequality if they were measured on annual basis. 
18 A related study by Gottschalk and Mayer (2002) shows that income adjusted for the value of home production is 
more equally distributed than unadjusted income in the U.S. 
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public transfers are more likely to fall into the bottom end of income distribution.  Over time, 
more non-working households report small positive income either because they started receiving 
public transfers or because payment of transfers became more regular.  This may explain why 
income inequality for the pooled sample of working and non-working families does not decrease 
over time. 
Inequality in consumption  
Figure 10 presents the dispersion of our benchmark measure of consumption, non-durable 
expenditure for all households, working and non-working.  We see that the dispersion of non-
durable consumption increases significantly during the downturn and falls rapidly during the 
economic recovery.  Other consumption variables follow this trend very closely, although their 
variance may have different magnitude.  In particular, adding durable expenditures (cD) 
increases consumption variance while adjusting for services from owned housing reduces it 
(cD+).  The equalizing effect of housing on consumption distribution is predictable since many 
households, especially older ones who are also poorer, inherited their housing from the Soviet 
era. 
Figure 10 also presents decomposition of non-durable consumption inequality based on 
equation (1). Similarly to household earnings decomposition in Figure 7, the dispersion of 
equivalized consumption is slightly lower than the dispersion of raw consumption.  The residual 
consumption inequality is large and follows the same time pattern as the raw measure of 
consumption inequality (Figure 10C).  As was the case with income decomposition, the largest 
observable contributors to consumption inequality are household composition and location.  
Education of household head explains some of the consumption inequality, but age explains 
almost none (Figure 10D).  By contrast, in the U.S. inequality across households typically grows 
with age.  The lack of correlation between measures of inequality and age in Russia is also 
reflected in the flat life-cycle inequality profiles (see Appendix 4).  
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Comparison of income and consumption inequality 
Figure 11 compares various measures of consumption and income inequality. While 
income inequality in the pooled sample of working and non-working households does not fall 
over time, consumption inequality rises during the downturn and falls during the recovery.  One 
remarkable result is that consumption inequality actually exceeds income inequality in 1996-
1998, which seems to be at odds with consumption smoothing.  This fact may be driven by the 
tendency of Russian households to store food as a means of short-term consumption smoothing.  
Then expenditure would actually equal consumption plus “saving” in the form of food inventory 
change.   
Why was food storage likely to spike in 1996-1998?  We think that irregularly paid 
wages and transfers as well as volatile and unpredictable inflation made real household monthly 
income highly variable (e.g., note the difference between actual and contractual earnings 
inequality in Figure 7).  In perfect financial markets, these income variations would be smoothed 
by changing the stock of household financial assets.  However, most households in our sample 
do not hold significant financial assets, perhaps due to undeveloped financial markets or the low 
real rate of return associated with rampant inflation (recall Figure 1A).  Instead, short-term 
consumption smoothing may have been done by adjusting food inventories: households that 
received several months of back pay purchased large quantities of storable food (i.e., flour, 
sugar, etc.) for future consumption.  In this case we can have households that spend little and 
consume from their food inventories as well as households that spend a lot on food, but do not 
consume all of it.  Thus, the presence of food storage can make expenditure inequality 
exaggerate consumption inequality.  Consistent with this hypothesis, statistical decomposition of 
residual expenditure variance shows that its transitory volatility peaked in 1996-1998 (see 
Section 5).    
In addition, income inequality may be subject to its own biases that would make it seem 
low relative to consumption inequality.  As previously discussed in Section 2, income is likely to 
be underreported. To the extent that income underreporting varies by income level, 
underreporting can introduce a bias in measures of cross-sectional income inequality.  For 
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example, if higher income households report a smaller fraction of their income than the average 
household, cross-sectional measures of income inequality will be biased downwards. In 
particular, a downward bias in income inequality can explain why the 90/50 ratio in Figure 11B 
is higher for consumption than for income throughout the entire sample period.19 
Expenditure inequality versus consumption inequality 
Compared to the US, expenditure inequality in Russia is puzzlingly high relative to 
income inequality. For example, Heathcote et al (2008) report that in the US consumption 
inequality is three times lower than income inequality.20  By contrast, expenditure and income 
inequality measures in Figure 11 are roughly comparable.  
Part of the explanation for the apparently high expenditure inequality in Russia is that 
expenditure only partially captures the actual consumption.  As noted in Section 2, many Russian 
households grow food on subsidiary plots and thus consume more food than their expenditure 
numbers suggest.  Although the aggregate amount of food produced at home is fairly small (5-10 
percent of non-durable expenditure), food production is concentrated among rural and poorer 
households.  This can make expenditure inequality significantly overstate the true consumption 
inequality.  It turns out that adjusting consumption for home-grown food produces a large 
equalizing effect on consumption distribution for all four measures of inequality, as can be seen 
in Figure 11, line cH.  The impact of home-grown food on consumption inequality is particularly 
large at the lower end of the consumption distribution (compare panel B to panel C).  Section 6 
additionally shows that accounting for differences in the cost of living by location (i.e. using 
region-specific price deflators) reduces consumption inequality even further (see Figure 13A).  
Thus, the distinction between expenditure and consumption in Russia is very important.  
Expenditure can be a noisy measure of consumption when households accumulate large 
inventories of goods (particularly, food) as a form of saving.  Also, expenditure is not a complete 
                                                 
19 There are also reasons to believe that income underreporting declined after 2001 (see Gorodnichenko et al 2009 
for evidence).  If this is the case, then the attenuation of income reporting bias towards the end of our sample period 
makes the true fall in income inequality even larger than that in Figures 7-9. 
20 Specifically, variance of the log of equivalized non-durable consumption is 0.24; variance of the log of 
equivalized household earnings is 0.75.  
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measure of consumption for households that heavily rely on home production.  Consequently, 
expenditure inequality overstates consumption inequality. Although the aggregate amount of 
home produced food is small, its effect on inequality measures is quite substantial.   
So far, our analysis of inequality measures relied on repeated cross-sections.  In the next 
section, we will exploit the panel dimension of the data and investigate to what extent changes in 
income inequality translate into changes in consumption inequality.  
5. Time Series Decomposition and Interaction of Income and Consumption 
Inequality 
To understand the dynamics of inequality and the interactions between consumption and 
income, we need to identify the sources of uncertainty faced by households and to assess 
households’ ability to smooth consumption.  As a first pass, we exploit the panel aspect of 
RLMS and decompose the residual variability in consumption and income into permanent and 
transitory components.  Specifically, we use a statistical model 
( )ln( ) sht ht hts X uβ= + ,  
where hts  is the variable of interest, such as income or consumption, and htX  is the same set of 
controls as in equation (1).  We decompose the residual term ( )shtu  into the sum of a transitory 
component and a permanent component that follows a random walk process: 
( ) ,sht ht htu α ε= +  (3) 
, 1 ,ht h t htα α η−= +  
where 2,~ (0, )ht tεε σ  is the transitory component and 2,~ (0, )ht tηη σ  is the innovation in the 
permanent component.  Note that the variances of the transitory and permanent components are 
allowed to be time-varying.  Using the covariance matrix for the changes in ( )shtu  and an equally 
weighted minimum distance estimator, we estimate the time series for 2,tεσ  and 2,tησ . The 
estimation procedure is described in more detail in Appendix 5.   
Variance of innovations to income 
The estimates of  2,tεσ  and 2,tησ  are reported in Figure 12, Panels A-C.  Each panel uses a 
separate income measure: individual labor earnings (ec) in panel A, household labor earnings 
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(yL) in panel B and household disposable income (yD) in panel C.  The time pattern for variances 
is similar for all three income measures: the variance of innovations in the permanent 
component, 2,tησ , remained relatively stable while the variance of transitory component, 2,tεσ , 
declined considerably.21  It appears that the fall in residual income inequality is primarily due to 
moderation of the transitory component. 
  The variances 2,tεσ  and 2,tησ  for permanent and transitory components of income are at 
least three times larger than comparable estimates for the U.S. (Heathcote et al 2008, Table 2). 
We do not think that this is due to differences in residual income inequality levels )( yhtu  between 
Russia and the US – the residual variance of log household earnings is 0.5 for the US and less 
than 0.6 for Russia (see Figure 7).  Rather, the comparison seems to point to different sources of 
residual income inequality between Russia and the US.  In Russia, residual inequality appears to 
be driven by high income mobility, making residuals )( yhtu  large and volatile.  By contrast, in the 
US, the combination of high )( yhtu  and low 
2
,tησ  points to the dispersion of unobserved household 
fixed effects, 0hα , as playing a larger role.22 
Variance of innovations to consumption  
We use the same statistical procedure to perform the decomposition of household 
consumption.  The results are reported in Figure 12D.  Unlike transitory income variance, the 
variance of the transitory consumption component, 2,tεσ , does not start to fall until after 1998.  
The variance of transitory consumption is highest in 1996-1998.  This seems to be consistent 
with our food storage story, as food inventory fluctuations would cause unexplained transitory 
consumption to be large.  
It is remarkable that the permanent component of consumption is as volatile as the 
permanent component of income (Figure 12D).  This sharply contrasts with recent trends in 
                                                 
21 In addition to individual and household labor earnings and disposable income reported in Figure 12, we find that 
other income measures such as household earnings with income from home production have a similar trend. 
22 To take an extreme case, suppose that errors have no time series volatility, that is, the residual income variance 
that is due to household fixed effects stays constant over time.  Then, the permanent-temporary decomposition will 
show zero variance for both ε and η.  By contrast, if regression errors have a lot of time variation, this will lead to 
high variance in η, or ε, or both.  In sum, the level of residual inequality is not necessarily related to the variances in 
the permanent-temporary decomposition 
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consumption and income inequality in the U.S., where dramatically increased income inequality 
did not translate into large increases in consumption inequality.  Such divergence between the 
two inequality measures in the U.S. has been explained by developments in financial markets 
that allow more risk sharing and consumption smoothing (Krueger and Perri 2006) and by the 
changes in the persistence of income shocks (Blundell et al 2008).  Russia witnessed significant 
advancements in financial markets (especially, consumer credit) towards the end of our sample 
period, yet we do not observe the divergence between consumption and income variance 
decompositions.23  The high variance of permanent consumption innovation is even more 
puzzling given that Russian households had a variety of consumption smoothing tools such as 
saving, food storage, home production, variable labor supply, and extended family.  On the other 
hand, the negative correlation between wages and hours and low savings are also consistent with 
the lack of insurance against income shocks (Heathcote et al 2007).   
Response of consumption to income innovations 
To look at possible changes in consumption smoothing patterns over time, we examine 
the response of consumption to innovations in the permanent and transitory components of 
income.  We continue to assume that the income process is given by equation (3) and re-estimate 
the income equation jointly with a consumption equation that captures the impact of income 
innovations on residual consumption growth.  We model the sensitivity of consumption to 
income components as in Blundell et al (2008): 
( )
, 1,
c
ht t ht t ht ht h tu φη ψ ε ξ ξ −Δ = + + −   (4) 
The left hand side of (4) is the growth rate of residual household consumption.  The first term in 
the right-hand side is the product of the permanent income innovation, htη , and the “loading” 
factor φt that measures the responsiveness of consumption to htη .  Similarly, the second term, 
ttεψ , measures the response of consumption growth to a temporary income innovation, htε  
given tψ  capturing the sensitivity of consumption to htε .  The term 2,~ (0, )ht tξξ σ  absorbs 
                                                 
23 Consumer credit more than doubled every year between 2002 and 2006 (Goskomstat 2006c). 
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measurement errors and unobserved household heterogeneity not attributed to income growth 
and other observables.  See Appendix 5 for more details on the estimation procedure. 
Blundell et al (2008) interpret loadings close to one24 as indicating the lack of insurance 
against innovations in income.  In contrast, if loadings are close to zero, then households have 
enough instruments (e.g., access to credit markets, self-insurance) to insulate consumption from 
income shocks.  Loadings between zero and one can be interpreted as partial insurance.25  
Table 1 presents the results from jointly estimating income equation (3) and consumption 
equation (4).  The loading on the transitory component, tψ , is relatively small and falling over 
time, consistent with households being able to smooth temporary income shocks.  The loading on 
the permanent income component, tφ , is much larger, perhaps, indicating imperfect consumption 
insurance against permanent shocks.  Nevertheless, tφ  is falling over time, consistent with an 
overall improvement in consumption insurance. 
It is informative to compare the estimates in Table 1 to those reported in Blundell et al 
(2008) for the 1978-1992 U.S. data with similar estimation methodology. The 2005 estimates of 
φt and ψt from our Table 1 are close to those reported in Blundell et al (2008, Table 7): 
0.64, 0.053φ ψ≈ ≈ .  Thus the sensitivity of consumption to income innovations is about the same 
for Russian households in 2005 and US households in 1978-1992.  By contrast, Russian 
households have a much higher variance of transitory and permanent income innovations: the 
Table 1 averages are 088.0,204.0 2,
2
, == tt ηε σσ  versus 013.0,051.0 2,2, ≈≈ tt ηε σσ  for the US 
(Blundell et al 2008, Table 6). 
The much more volatile income of Russian households makes potential welfare gains 
from consumption insurance much higher in Russia.  Using our estimates, we can compute the 
variance of consumption growth that is due to innovations in income (Table 1, column 8), 
2 2 2 2 2
, , ,cy t t t t tη εσ φ σ ψ σ= + . 
                                                 
24 Loading coefficients cannot exceed 1 because this would violate household lifetime budget constraint. 
25 Blundell et al (2008) show that under certain restrictions the permanent income hypothesis implies φ=1 and ψ=0. 
That is, consumption should change by the same percentage as the change in the permanent income (φ=1), and it 
should not respond at all to transitory components (ψ=0). 
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The above variance can be used to estimate welfare gains from consumption insurance.  Lucas 
(1987) shows a household with risk aversion parameter γ  would be willing to sacrifice up to 
21
,2 cy tγσ  share of their income to have a perfectly smooth consumption path.  The Blundell et al 
(2008) parameters yield 0056.02 , ≈tcyσ , while our Table 1, column 8 estimates of the same are 5-
14 times larger.  This means that Russian households should be willing to give up a 5-14 larger 
income share than the US households to achieve perfect consumption smoothing (assuming the 
same risk aversion parameter).26  Intuitively, this result obtains because variance of consumption 
that is attributable to variance in income is much larger in Russia than it is in the US. 
However, most of the variance in residual consumption growth is not attributable to 
income.  Income innovations can only explain between 14 and 22 percent of variance in non-
durable consumption growth (compare Table 1, columns 9 and 10).  There may be several 
reasons for this. For example, consumption out of irregular unreported income and changes in 
food inventories would both be categorized as unexplained consumption growth. In addition, our 
chosen observables do not exhibit much time variation, but both consumption and income vary a 
lot over time, perhaps due to high occupational mobility.  Finally, measurement errors and 
preference shocks could also contribute to unexplained consumption growth.   
Overall, our findings suggest that income and consumption mobility was high in the early 
years of our sample, and that the ranking of households in the income distribution has been 
stabilizing in recent years.  Despite recent improvements, households have had limited ability to 
smooth income shocks with financial assets, savings or other insurance instruments, and the 
benefit from providing access to such insurance probably remains substantial.  
 
6. A Closer Look at Inequality Trends: the Role of Location and Prices 
 In the context of the Russian economy, two factors deserve special consideration as they 
can help with understanding of the observed inequality trends.  This section takes a closer look at 
the role of geography and price dispersion. 
                                                 
26 This result has an important caveat: if households smooth consumption with food storage, this would induce 
strong response of expenditure to transitory income shocks, but will not necessary imply non-smooth consumption. 
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Location effect 
Russia is a large and diverse country, both geographically and economically.  For 
example, monetary income per capita in the richest Russian region is 10.6 times larger than per-
capita income in the poorest region in 2005 (Goskomstat 2007b).  A similar maximum-to-
minimum ratio across states in the U.S. is only 1.8 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). 
Location is the most important explanatory variable for the dispersion of earnings and 
consumption (see Figures 7 and 10).  The substantial dispersion of the regional component of 
inequality may be associated with the large geographic variation in the cost of living.  The 2005 
ratio in the cost of fixed consumer goods between the most expensive region and the least 
expensive region was 2.7 (Goskomstat 2006a).  With such inter-regional diversity, using a 
common national CPI may overstate the extent of inequality in both income and consumption.  
Indeed, using regional CPI and accounting for the regional differences in the cost of living move 
the magnitude of inequality down, but this adjustment does not affect the time trend (see Figure 
13A). 
The regional dispersion of expenditure may also be affected by uneven distribution of 
amounts of food grown at home between urban and rural households.  While big city residents 
purchase more than 95 percent of their food at the store, residents of small towns and villages 
purchase about 80 percent at the store (less in early years) and grow the rest on their subsidiary 
plots.  Consequently, rural households are likely to have a larger discrepancy between 
expenditure inequality and consumption inequality.  Panels B and C of Figure 13 implicitly 
confirm this.  The panels depict the variance of the log of non-durable expenditures for the two 
groups and the pooled sample using regional deflators, with and without food grown at home.  
Expenditure inequality is apparently much higher among the rural population (Panel B).  By 
contrast, inequality in consumption that includes food purchased and grown at home is much 
more similar across urban and rural households (panel C). 
While time trends in expenditure inequality for the two groups are similar, trends in 
consumption inequality diverge during economic recovery.  In particular, consumption inequality 
among rural households shows no downward trend (panel C).  This difference in trends is 
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consistent with transition of rural households from subsidiary farming to professional farming, 
which could have made the amount of food grown for own consumption more unequally 
distributed. 
Economic consequences of downturn and recovery may have differed between urban and 
rural populations.  One would expect rural households to fall behind during the transition due to 
the lack of access to large and diverse labor markets that big cities offer and also because of 
possible migration of the ablest workers to cities. 
Surprisingly, our data do not point to much divergence in the mean levels of income and 
consumption of the two groups until 2002.  Figure 13D shows that the relative levels of 
disposable income (yD), expenditures (c, cD) and consumption (cH) stay fairly constant during 
1994-2001.  It is possible that rural households were already behind when our sample began – 
recall the discussion in Section 2.  On the other hand, the relative consumption level of urban 
household was at its all-time high in 2002, 2004 and 2005, suggesting that rural households did 
lag behind as the economic recovery progressed.  Particularly, the growth of durable 
consumption was stronger among urban households (c and cD lines in Figure 13D diverge after 
2000). 
The role of food grown at home in equalizing consumption is strikingly apparent in 
Figure 13D.  Urban households, who spend 45 percent more than rural households, enjoy only 29 
percent higher consumption, on average (compare c and cH lines).27 
Comparisons of group income and consumption differences reveal important facts.  On 
average, urban households report roughly 71 percent more disposable income than rural 
households, but their total expenditure is just 45 percent higher.  Because saving rates of most 
households are fairly low, this leads us to suspect that income under-reporting is more severe 
among the rural households.   
                                                 
27 Market value of home production probably overstates its net contribution to household welfare because of the cost 
of capital goods and materials and decreased leisure.  Selling food is also likely to involve high transaction costs, 
making net income from home production lower than its value at market prices.  
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Price dispersion effect 
Data on food prices available in RLMS allow us to investigate the effect of prices on the 
mean and the variance of real expenditures.  It is important to examine price data for two 
reasons: (1) there is a concern that the growth rates of real output and expenditures may be 
mismeasured due to a bias in the official CPI (Gibson et al 2004), (2) expenditure inequality can 
arise as a result of either price dispersion or quantity dispersion, and only the latter captures 
inequality in actual consumption.  
Using the data on food prices, we find that the official CPI substantially overstates 
inflation during 1994-1998.  We also find that the effect of price dispersion on inequality is 
relatively small: inequality measures based on expenditures and those based on quantities 
purchased are close to each other. 
Figure 1C shows that food expenditure fell faster than income during the 1994-1998 
downturn (see Figure 1B and also the discussion in Mroz et al 2005), but never returned to its 
1994 level during the economic recovery.  Since food expenditures declined rapidly during the 
early, high inflation, period, one may suspect that the decline is not genuine and may be driven 
by a bias in the national CPI that we use to deflate food expenditures.   
To check this, we construct the food CPI from RLMS prices and compare it to the NIPA 
deflator for food.  Let pkt denote the sample average unit price of food category k in year t, and 
qkt denote the average physical quantity of food item k purchased in year t.  Let kp  and kq  be the 
sample average price and the quantity purchased in the base year.  Define a fixed-basket food 
CPI as 
,RLMS t kt k k kk k
cpiF p q p q= ∑ ∑    
Figure 14A depicts the year-on-year growth rates of  tRLMScpiF ,  (with base year 2002) and 
the NIPA CPI deflator.28  Unfortunately, the two deflators are not directly comparable, because 
we could not replicate the NIPA procedure without knowing the NIPA choice of base year and 
when it was changed.  Predictably, two deflators in Figure 14A disagree most during the years 
                                                 
28 To make it comparable, we calculate the NIPA inflation rate as the average monthly inflation rate weighted by the 
share of respondents interviewed in a given month. 
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with high inflation: the inflation rate derived from RLMS data on food prices is lower than the 
official CPI inflation in 1995 and 1998 years.  As a result, between December 1994 and 
December 1998 food prices in RLMS grew by a factor of 4.5, compared to a factor of 5.6 
according to NIPA.  If the RLMS food deflator was used in place of the official CPI to compute 
real consumption, the 1998 value of aggregate consumption (cD) in Figure 1 would have been 
almost 25 percent higher. 
The CPI deflator can also be subject to substitution bias if the composition of food 
consumption changes.  To check whether this is the case, we compare two alternative measures 
of real food expenditures: nominal expenditures deflated by the fixed-basket food CPI, cFRLMS,t  
, ,RLMS t kt kt RLMS tk
cF p q cpiF= ∑  
and the food quantity index, qFRLMS,t 
,RLMS t k ktk
qF p q= ∑  
that weights current year quantities at base year prices.  By construction, the ratio of the two 
expenditure measures equals the ratio of the CPI derived from the current year basket to the CPI 
derived from the base year basket.  If cFRLMS,t  and qFRLMS,t are substantially different, this is an 
indication of a time-varying consumption basket. 
Figure 14B compares cFRLMS,t  and qFRLMS,t and find that they are very similar to each 
other, suggesting that the food consumption basket was essentially fixed throughout the sample 
period.  However, the real food consumption cF (computed with the official deflator) is 
substantially higher than both cFRLMS,t and qFRLMS,t during 1994-1998, indicating inflation 
overstatement by the official CPI.   
Despite their apparent differences, all measures of real food expenditure show a decline 
over the sample period.  The share of food in aggregate expenditures also steadily declined over 
the sample period (Figure 14C).  From a viewpoint of static utility maximization, a change in 
demand may be driven either by a change in income or a change in relative price.  We do not 
think that income change was driving the food demand, because real income was roughly the 
same in 1994 as in 2002, but food expenditures were much lower in 2002 than in 1994.  The 
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ratio of NIPA food deflator to NIPA non-food goods deflator (that excludes services), a proxy 
for the relative price of food, has also not changed (Figure 14D).  Superficially, at least, there is 
no change in the relative price of food either, so the apparent fall in the share of food 
expenditures is puzzling. 
We think that one explanation for this puzzle may be the lack of quality adjustment in the 
NIPA non-food CPI.  The Soviet-era consumer goods were notorious for their low quality.  If the 
relative quality of non-food goods rose over the sample period, this may have caused the quality-
adjusted goods price to fall and the expenditure share to shift away from food towards non-food 
goods.   
To summarize, our examination of food price and quantity data and its comparison with 
NIPA price indices point to evidence of quality bias.  Gibson et al (2004) use RLMS food 
expenditure data to indirectly infer the total CPI bias from Engel curves and estimate that 2001 
real GDP level may be understated by as much as 30 percent.  
It is also important to check if the observed level of inequality in food expenditures arises 
from the difference in food prices that households face.  Russia is a geographically diverse 
country with large variations in the price level by location.  Other peculiar features of the 
Russian transition, including price liberalization, hyperinflation spikes, regional disintegration, 
imperfect markets, and elevated uncertainty, may contribute to relatively high price dispersion 
not only across locations but also within locations.  As the economy stabilizes and markets 
develop, we may expect a decline in the level of price dispersion.  On the other hand, the Soviet 
era products were fairly standardized with low quality variance.  Over time, import penetration 
and domestic competition have brought new products of various qualities, thus increasing price 
dispersion.  The resulting effect of transition on price dispersion is thus ambiguous.  Figure 15A 
shows the trends in dispersion of food prices, overall and within location.29  Price dispersion was 
high in 1994 but stayed constant afterwards, suggesting that counter-factors of dispersion cancel 
each other out.   
                                                 
29 Price dispersion is calculated as 0 0 0 0( ) (ln ){[ ] / [ ]}kt kh kh kh khk h k hVar P Var p q p q p=∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
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To control for cross-sectional price dispersion, we measure the inequality in food 
quantity index, qFRLMS,t, that weights the quantity of food purchased at constant, base year prices.  
Figure 15B compares the variances of ln(qFRLMS,t) and ln(cF).  Quantity dispersion does not have 
to be lower than expenditure dispersion, because the prices paid by individual households and 
the quantity of food that they purchased may be negatively correlated.  In fact, Figure 15B shows 
that quantity dispersion is slightly higher than expenditure dispersion in 1995 and 1996 and 
slightly lower than expenditure dispersion in other years.  Overall, the inequality trends for food 
expenditures and food quantity are similar.   
Expenditure inequality may also be affected by regional differences in the cost of living.  
To control for this, we deflate food expenditures by regional CPI.  The cF-reg line of Figure 15B 
shows the resulting measure of expenditure inequality.  Predictably, using regional price 
adjustment has an equalizing effect on consumption distribution.  Food expenditures with 
regional deflators show less dispersion than the food quantity index qFRLMS,t, which indicates a 
negative correlation between the region-specific food prices and the quantity purchased.    
 
7. Conclusions 
We investigate the levels and the time trends of consumption and income inequality in 
Russia.  The paper makes a number of contributions on issues of inequality measurement.  We 
explain, for example, why consumption that includes home production, avoids underreporting of 
resources available to households, and is adjusted for regional variation in the cost of living 
should be a preferred inequality measure for Russian economy.  We find that compared to its 
pre-transition level, inequality first rose and subsequently fell.  The rise in inequality appeared to 
have happened during the price liberalization in the early 1990s while the fall started after 2000.  
The level of inequality in Russia is now very similar to that in the U.S. (e.g., Krueger and Perri 
2006). 
We uncover several important facts about inequality in Russia.  First, poor households 
appear to gain from recent economic growth.  Second, changes in key observable characteristics 
of households have a small contribution to the dynamics of consumption and income inequality.  
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The variance of permanent and transitory income components is much larger in Russia than in 
developed countries.  Because of this, the fluctuations of consumption that are attributable to 
income shocks are larger in Russia as well.  There are probably substantial gains from 
introducing insurance schemes to smooth consumption fluctuations.  Third, recent moderation in 
consumption and income inequality and mobility appears to be driven by the decline in the 
volatility of transitory shocks.  Fourth, unlike developed economies that presumably have rich 
consumption smoothing possibilities, expenditure and income inequality in Russia are not far 
apart.  
Our results also point out some inconsistencies between RLMS and NIPA.  In particular, 
comparisons of consumption levels across data sources suggest that there may be an insufficient 
adjustment for shadow economic activity in the official statistics.  The growth rate of 
consumption in NIPA has recently become higher than that in RLMS, a phenomenon that was 
noted in other developing economies (e.g., Deaton 2005).  The comparison of CPI levels reveals 
that NIPA may significantly overstate inflation, and that quality bias is potentially important. 
Our analysis highlights several phenomena that merit further research.  For example, the 
negative experience premium for males sharply contrasts with positive experience premium in 
other countries.  Another puzzling finding is that income shocks explain a modest part of non-
durable consumption variance.  This could be due to consumer durables playing a bigger role in 
consumption smoothing, especially when financial markets are underdeveloped.  There is 
theoretical work showing that income shocks can mostly be absorbed by durable consumption 
(e.g., Leahy and Zeira, 2005 and Stacchetti and Stolyarov, 2007).  The panel structure of RLMS 
provides a natural data set for investigating the role of durable expenditure as a propagation 
mechanism for income shocks.   
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Table 1: Estimates of Consumption Response to Income Innovations.  
Year 
Variance of 
innovation in a 
component of income 
 
Loadings on 
components 
Variance of residual consumption growth rate due to 
Innovations in components of 
income  
Measurement 
errors and 
unobserved 
household 
heterogeneity, 
2
,tξσ  
TotalTransitory, 
2
,tεσ  
Permanent, 
2
,tησ  
Transitory
tψ  
Permanent
tφ  
Transitory
2
,
2
tt εσψ  
Permanent
2
,
2
tt ησφ  
Total 
2
,tcyσ   
1995 0.257 0.069  0.125 0.908 0.0040 0.061 0.065  0.490 0.555
1996 0.305 0.069  0.125 0.908 0.0048 0.062 0.067  0.494 0.561
1998 0.238 0.092  0.174 0.801 0.0072 0.066 0.074  0.512 0.586
2000 0.213 0.115  0.151 0.561 0.0048 0.041 0.046  0.489 0.535
2001 0.184 0.093  0.040 0.568 0.0003 0.030 0.031  0.404 0.435
2002 0.166 0.107  0.028 0.559 0.0001 0.034 0.034  0.353 0.386
2003 0.169 0.071  0.036 0.629 0.0002 0.028 0.028  0.339 0.367
2004 0.153 0.085  0.032 0.718 0.0002 0.044 0.044  0.310 0.354
2005 0.153 0.085  0.032 0.718 0.0002 0.044 0.044  0.289 0.334
Average 0.204 0.088  0.083 0.708 0.0024 0.046 0.048  0.409 0.457
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Figure 1: Trends in Household Income and Consumption 
Notes:  Panel A shows annual inflation rate using national end-year CPI from official sources.  In 
remaining panels, all measures are in constant December 2002 prices (deflated using national 
monthly CPI and the date of interview).  yL = household contractual labor earnings per month; yL+ 
= yL+ net private transfers; y = (yL+) + financial income; yD = disposable household income = y + 
government transfers;  cF = expenditures on food, beverages, and tobacco last week (multiplied by 
30/7); c = household non-durable expenditures last month; cH = c + consumption of home-grown 
food; cD = c + expenditures on durables; cD+ = cD + imputed services from housing.  
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Figure 2:  Comparison of RLMS with Official Statistics 
 
Notes:  For comparability purposes, the following RLMS measures are selected: yD in panel A, cD 
in panel B, cF + consumption of home-grown food in panel C, cD - cF in panel D.  The RLMS 
sample is unrestricted.  All RLMS measures are deflated using monthly CPI and the date of 
interview. All NIPA and HBS measures are deflated using annual average CPI.  RLMS income and 
consumption for 1997 are imputed using the lagged RLMS value multiplied by the 1997 growth 
rate from NIPA. 
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Figure 3: Trends in Labor Supply 
 
Notes:  wa = hourly wage rate based on earnings received last month; wc = contractual hourly wage 
rate; ha = hours worked last month; hc = usual hours of work per month.  All wages are deflated 
with national monthly CPI.  Workers are considered full-time if actual hours at primary job were 
more than 120 hours in the reference month.  Panel D compares employment-population ratios in 
the RLMS sample (R:) and official Goskomstat statistics (G:).  Both ratios are calculated for age 
group 25-59. 
 
10
20
30
40
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
wa male wa fem wc male wc fem
A.Hourly wage in 2002 rubles
35
40
45
50
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
ha male ha fem hc male hc fem
B.Weekly hours of work
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
male female
C.Share of full-time workers
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
R: male R: fem G: male G: fem
D.Employment to population ratio
46 
 
Figure 4: Basic Inequality in Individual Wages 
Notes:  ea = actual individual labor earnings received last month; ec = contractual individual 
labor earnings per month; wa = hourly wage rate based on earnings received last month; wc = 
contractual hourly wage rate.  Var-log is the variance of log earnings.  All earnings are after-tax. 
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Figure 5: Wage Premia 
 
Notes:  ec = contractual individual labor earnings per month; wc = contractual hourly wage rate.  
All earnings are after-tax.  Education premium is the average wage of university educated males 
divided by the average wage of non university-educated males.  Gender premium is the average 
wage of males divided by the average wage of females.  Experience premium is the average wage 
of age group 45-55 divided by the average wage of age group 25-35.  The variance of residuals is 
from equation (1). 
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Figure 6:  Inequality in Labor Supply 
 
Notes:  wa = hourly wage rate based on earnings received last month; wc = contractual hourly 
wage rate; ha = hours worked last month; hc = usual hours of work per month. 
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Figure 7:  Household Earnings Inequality and Its Decomposition 
 
Notes:  All earnings are after-tax and deflated using national monthly CPI.  yLa = actual 
household labor earnings received last month; yLc = household contractual labor earnings per 
month; yL = household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response.  Panel C 
reports the variance of log raw yL, the variance of log yL equivalized with an OECD equivalence 
scale, and the variance of residuals from equation (1).  Panel D reports the variance of each 
observable component of equation (1). 
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Figure 8:  Basic Inequality in Equivalized Household Earnings 
 
Notes:  All earnings are after-tax, equivalized using an OECD equivalence scale, and deflated using 
national monthly CPI.  yLa = actual household labor earnings received last month; yL = household 
contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response. 
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Figure 9:  From Wages to Disposable Income 
 
Notes:  All income measures are after-tax and deflated using national monthly CPI.  Measures at 
the household level are also equivalized using an OECD equivalence scale. HH head wc = 
contractual hourly wage rate of the head of household; HH head ec = contractual labor earnings 
per month of the head of household; yL = household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted 
for non-response; yL+ = yL+ private transfers; y = (yL+) + financial income; yD = disposable 
household income = y + government transfers; yH = yL + income from home production.  
Working households include households with at least one wage earner.  Var-log is the variance of 
the logarithm of income. 
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Figure 10:  Consumption Inequality and Its Decomposition 
 
Notes:  cF = expenditures on food, beverages, and tobacco last week (multiplied by 30/7); c = 
household non-durable expenditures last month; cD = c + expenditures on durables; cD+ = cD + 
imputed services from housing.  All consumption variables in Panels A and B are per adult 
equivalent.  Panel C reports the variance of log raw c, the variance of log c equivalized with an 
OECD equivalence scale, and the variance of the residuals from equation (1).  Panel D reports the 
variance of each observable component from equation (1).   
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Figure 11:  From Disposable Income to Consumption 
 
Notes:  yD = disposable household income based on contractual labor earnings; c = household non-
durable expenditures last month; cH = c + consumption of home-grown food.  All measures are 
equivalized using an OECD equivalence scale and deflated with national monthly CPI.   
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 Figure 12:  Permanent-Temporary Component Decompositions 
 
Notes:  The figure reports the time series of estimated variance of permanent and transitory 
components.  The estimated process is uht=αht + εht, αht =αh,t-1 + ηht, where εht is the transitory 
component and ηht is the permanent component.  In all specifications, uht is the residual from 
projecting the relevant measure of income or consumption on our baseline vector of observable 
characteristics of households; ec = contractual labor earnings of the household head; yL = 
household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response; yD = disposable 
household income based on contractual labor earnings; c = household non-durable expenditures last 
month. Values in 1998 and 2000 are adjusted for the fact that the permanent component is 
accumulated over two years.  For both permanent and transitory components, 1997 and 1999 values 
are set equal to 1998 and 2000 values respectively.   
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Figure 13: Within-Group and Between-Group Inequality 
 
Notes:  Rural location is defined as villages and small towns.  yD = disposable household income 
based on contractual labor earnings; c = household non-durable expenditures last month; cD = c + 
expenditures on durables; cH = c + consumption of home-grown food.  All measures are 
equivalized using an OECD equivalence scale and deflated with regional CPI unless indicated 
otherwise.   
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Figure 14:  Trends in Food Expenditures 
 
Notes: cF_RLMS = expenditures on food, beverages, and tobacco last week (multiplied by 30/7) 
deflated using national monthly CPI; cF_RLMS = expenditures on food, beverages, and tobacco 
last week deflated using RLMS food CPI; qF_RLMS = food quantity index in constant 2002 
mean prices for each location.  Panel C reports the share of food expenditures cF in aggregate 
consumption expenditures cD.  All food expenditures are per adult equivalent.  
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Figure 15:  Inequality in Food Expenditures 
 
Notes: cF = expenditures on food, beverages, and tobacco last week (multiplied by 30/7) deflated 
using national monthly CPI; cF-reg = cF deflated using regional CPI and adjusted for regional 
differences in cost of living; qF = food quantity index in constant 2002 mean prices for each 
location.  All food expenditures are per adult equivalent.   
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Appendix 1: Data Description 
 
Description of RLMS sample 
 
This study uses ten rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) that was conducted in 1994-1996, 1998, and 2000-2005.  
RLMS was not conducted in 1997 and 1999.  Time-series reported on the figures are linearly interpolated for missing annual data points. 
The RLMS sample consists of the 38 randomly selected primary sample units (municipalities) that are representative of the whole country.  They 
are located in 32 regions (or constituent subjects of the Russian Federation) and 7 federal districts.  Russia had 89 constituent subjects and 7 
federal districts as of December 1, 2005. 
 
Sample restrictions  
 
We restrict our sample to households in which at least one individual is 25-60 years old.  The head of the household in the selected sample is the 
oldest working-age male or the oldest working-age female if no working-age males are present.  If more than one person of the same age-gender 
is qualified for the head, then the reference person (or the first person surveyed in the roster files) is chosen.  
 
General notes 
 
1. All income variables are after tax. 
 
2. All income and consumption variables are constructed on a monthly basis. 
 
3. Summary statistics are weighted with individual and household sample weights provided in the RLMS.   
 
4. When a household purchased the item but did not report the amount of the purchase, the missing amounts are imputed by regressing the log 
of expenditure on the complete interaction between year dummies and federal district dummies, controlling for the size of the household (5 
categories), number of children 16 years old or younger (4 categories), number of elderly members 60+ (3 categories), and urban location.  
Because of the log dependent variable, the predicted values of expenditures are adjusted as ݕ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሺߪොଶ/2ሻ݁ݔ݌൫log ݕ෣൯.  The subcategories 
with the largest number of missing values include utilities (2.12% of the sample), gasoline and motor oil (1.63%), transportation services 
(1.54%), and contributions to non-relatives (1.35%). Missing values for other subcategories are trivial. 
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5. Similar regression-based imputations are performed for missing subcategories of non-labor income and income from home production.  
Imputations of labor income are described in the table below.  Although the share of missing values for each individual subcategory of non-
labor income and expenditures is very small, altogether missing values affect about a third of surveyed households.  Our imputation 
procedure is an improvement over the existing RLMS practice that treats missing values as zeros in computing aggregate income and 
expenditures. 
 
Variable description and notes 
 
 Variable Name Definition Notes 
Individual Earnings and Labor Supply 
ha Actual hours of work 
last month 
= hours worked last month at primary job + 
hours worked last month at secondary job + 
hours spent last month on regular individual 
economic activities (activities for which an 
individual is paid for regularly, such as sewing a 
dress, assisting with repairs, selling goods in a 
market or on the street, etc.) 
Unusually high hours are top coded at 480 
hours per month (16 hours per day*30 days)  
    
hc Usual hours of work 
per month 
=  4 times usual hours in a typical week at 
primary job + 4 times usual hours in a typical 
week at secondary job + hours spent last month 
on regular individual economic activities. 
hc is available in 1998-2005 only.  Unusually 
high hours are top coded at 480 hours per 
month (16 hours per day*30 days).   
    
status Working status = full-time if actual hours at primary job≥120,  
part-time if actual hours at primary job<120,  
not working if a respondent did not work last 
month at primary job, was not on a temporary 
leave, and was not engaged in regular individual 
economic activities 
 
    
ea Actual labor earnings 
last month 
= money received last month from primary job + 
money received last month from secondary job + 
The variable is highly volatile during the 
period of wage arrears since a worker may 
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money received last month from regular 
individual economic activities + payments in 
kind received last month from primary job + 
payments in kind received last month from 
secondary job 
not receive any money last month or receive 
back payments for several months at once. 
    
ec Contractual labor 
earnings per month 
1998-2005, all employees: 
= monthly average (over the last 12 months) 
after-tax labor earnings of an employee at 
primary job + money received last month from 
additional jobs for all employees in 1998-2005 
 
1994-1996, employees with wage arrears: 
= total accumulated wage debt divided by the 
number of months of overdue wages + money 
received last month from additional jobs for 
employees with wage arrears at primary job in 
1994-1996  
 
1994-1996, employees  with no wage arrears: 
= monetary portion of wa for employees with no 
wage arrears 
 
All years, self-employed: 
= monetary portion of wa for self-employed (or 
individuals reporting place of work other than an 
organization), including those involved in 
regular individual economic activities in all 
years. 
1. ec does not include payments in kind. 
2. Average monthly earnings are available 
for an employee at primary job in 1998-
2005. 
3. Implausibly low earnings below ½ of the 
official minimum monthly wage are 
recoded into missing (0.47% of positive 
earnings). 
4. Implausibly high earnings are also 
recorded into missing if the residuals 
exceed five standard deviations from the 
mean after controlling for occupational 
categories, hours of work, age, age 
squared, years of schooling, and 
individual fixed effects (0.13% of positive 
earnings).  
5. For household aggregation purposes, if a 
respondent worked last month at least one 
hour but has missing contractual earnings, 
missing values are imputed using 
occupational categories, hours of work, 
gender, age, age squared, years of 
schooling, urban location and federal 
district dummies (the share of imputed 
earnings is 7.8%). 
    
wa Hourly wage rate last = ea / ha  
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month 
    
wc Contractual hourly 
wage rate 
= ec / hc hc is available in 1998-2005 only; wc is 
calculated for non-imputed earnings 
Household Income 
yLa Actual labor earnings 
received last month 
After-tax payments received by all household 
members from all places of work in the form of 
money, goods, and services in the last 30 days as 
reported by the reference person of the 
household. 
The variable is highly volatile during the 
period of wage arrears. 
    
yLc Contractual labor 
earnings per month 
The sum of ec across all individual respondents 
within the household. 
Such aggregation omits those adult household 
members who did not respond to an 
individual questionnaire; the response rate for 
working age individuals within the surveyed 
household is 96.5%. 
    
yL Contractual labor 
earnings per month 
adjusted for non-
response 
= yLc + imputed contractual labor earnings for 
working-age non-respondents within the 
household. 
Labor earnings of working-age non-
respondents are imputed as predicted earnings 
times the predicted probability of working 
using the full set of interactions between the 
four age groups (18-60) and two gender 
groups and controlling for urban and federal 
district dummies for each year separately. 
    
yH Labor earnings plus 
income from home 
production 
= yL + 0.9h, where h is average monthly income 
from home-grown food in the last year defined 
as the sum of physical quantity of produced food 
items (minus items given away) multiplied by 
their mean price in a given region, 0.9 is the 
assumed labor share of home food production. 
Mean prices are obtained in two steps. First, 
the household-specific market price of 
individual food item is calculated by dividing 
the cost of purchase by the amount purchased 
in the last 7 days.  Then the mean price of 
individual food items is computed for each 
region (oblast) and year. 
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yL+ Labor earnings plus 
net private transfers 
= yL + private transfers received last month – 
private transfers given to individuals outside the 
household unit last month.  
“Private transfers received” include received 
alimonies and 11 subcategories of 
contributions from persons outside the 
household unit, including contributions from 
relatives, friends, charity, international 
organizations, etc.  “Private transfers given” 
include alimonies paid and various 
contributions in money and in kind given to 
individuals outside the household unit (6 
categories). 
    
y Household income 
before government 
transfers 
= yL + net private transfers + financial income 
received last month. 
Financial income includes dividends on 
stocks and interest on bank accounts. 
    
yD Disposable household 
income 
= y + public transfers. 
 
Public transfers include government pensions, 
state child benefits, stipends, unemployment 
benefits, and government welfare payments. 
Household Consumption 
cF Market expenditures 
on food, alcohol and 
tobacco 
Monthly expenditures on food, alcohol, and 
tobacco are computed as the sum of expenditures 
on individual items in the reference week 
multiplied by 30/7=4.286.     
Items include 50 categories of food at home 
and away from home, alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products. 
See Appendix 2 for details of computation. 
    
qF Food quantity index 
t k ktk
qF p q= ∑ , where qkt is the quantity of food 
item k purchased in year t and kp is average price 
of item k for each location (psu) in the base year 
(2002). 
 
    
c Non-durable 
expenditures 
Sum of expenditures on non-durables in the last 
30 days.  Non-durable items include food, 
alcohol, tobacco, clothing and footwear, gasoline 
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and other fuel expenses, rents and utilities, and 
15-20 subcategories of services (such as 
transportation, repair, health care services, 
education, entertainment, recreation, insurance, 
etc.). 
cD Aggregate 
expenditures 
= c + expenditures on durables in the last 3 
months / 3.  Durable items include 10 
subcategories such as major appliances, vehicles, 
furniture, entertainment equipment, etc. 
 
This is compared with purchases of goods and 
services from NIPA 
 
cH Non-durable 
expenditures plus 
consumption of home-
grown food 
= c + consumption of home-grown food, where 
the last term is calculated as average monthly 
quantities of consumed home-grown food items 
multiplied by their mean price in a given region. 
Mean prices are determined in the same way 
as in yH. 
    
cD+ Aggregate 
expenditures plus 
services from housing 
= cD + imputed services from housing. Imputed services from housing are calculated 
as 5% of the current housing market value 
divided by 12. 
    
Adjustments to Income and Consumption 
equiv OECD equivalence 
scale 
This equivalence scale assigns a value of 1.0 to 
the first adult household member, a value of 0.7 
to each additional adult, and a value of 0.5 to 
each child 16 years old and younger. 
 
    
cpit National monthly CPI  All income and consumption variables are 
deflated in prices of 2002 using monthly national 
CPI. 
If the date of interview is in the first half of 
month, the previous month CPI is used.  If the 
date of interview is in the second half of 
month, the current month CPI is used. 
    
deft Regional deflator Deflator that combines monthly national CPI, 
December to December regional CPIs, and the 
To adjust for monthly inflation, the flow 
variables are expressed in December prices of 
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regional value of fixed basket of goods and 
services.  
 
each year by using a country average monthly 
CPI and the date of interview. Next, the 
annual (December to December) CPI for each 
32 oblasts (regions) is applied to convert the 
flow variables into prices of December 2002.  
Finally, these real values are adjusted for 
regional differences in the cost-of-living by 
using the regional value of fixed basket of 
goods and services. 
cpiFRLMS,t RLMS food CPI ,RLMS t kt k k kk kcpiF p q p q= ∑ ∑ , where pkt denote 
the sample average unit price of food category k 
in year t; kp  and kq  are the sample average price 
and the quantity of food item k purchased in the 
base year.   
 
Control Variables 
DH Household 
composition 
Vector of household composition variables: 4 
categories for the number of children 16 years 
old and younger (0, 1, 2, and 3+), 3 categories 
for the number of seniors 60 years old and older 
(0, 1, and 2+), and 5 categories for the number of 
household members (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5+). 
 
    
 Demographics A female dummy and continuous age variable a.  
    
DE Schooling A set of dummies for educational attainment of 
the head of household (incomplete secondary, 
secondary, vocational, technical, and university) 
 
DL Location variables A set of dummies for 7 federal districts, a 
dummy for Moscow and St. Petersburg, and a 
dummy for urban location. 
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Appendix 2:  Constructing Food Expenditures 
 
This appendix describes the steps in constructing our measure of food expenditures.   
1. RLMS food data contain information on the physical quantity and monetary value of last 
week purchases for 50 categories of food at home and away from home, alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products.  We first create wx-orig as the sum of 
expenditures on these individual items multiplied by 30/7=4.286.  Missing values for this 
measure are treated as zero. 
2. The RLMS questionnaire also asks about the total sum of food purchases in the last 30 days 
(mx-orig).  We discard this measure because of a potentially large measurement error, higher 
probability of underreporting, and ambiguity in the question (e.g., it is likely to exclude 
beverages and tobacco).  We note, however, that the two measures of food expenditures have 
similar variance (compare wx-orig and mx-orig in figure below). 
3. When a household purchased the item but did not report the quantity of the purchase, the 
missing quantities are imputed by regressing the log of expenditure on the complete 
interaction between year dummies and federal district dummies, controlling for the size of 
the household (5 categories), number of children 16 years old or younger (4 categories), 
number of elderly members 60+ (3 categories), and urban location.  Because of the log 
dependent variable, the predicted values of expenditures are adjusted as ݕ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሺߪොଶ/
2ሻ݁ݔ݌൫log ݕ෣൯.  Missing values for food items are generally trivial. 
4. We use top coding of unreasonably high prices in excess of 3 interquantile ranges above the 
mean prices in a given location as well as unreasonably high amounts (quantities) of food 
purchases (the top 99th percentile), conditional on the household structure and location.  Top 
coding and imputations does not change the mean value and only slightly reduce the variance 
(see wx-topc in figure below) 
5. It is very well known that inequality measures, especially those based on logarithms, are very 
sensitive to very low values.  For that reason, we eliminate the bottom 1% of total food 
consumption (from purchases and home production) in constant 2002 prices (about 12 
percent of the cost of the reference basket of 25 major food items reported by Goskomstat in 
2002).  While this procedure does not change the mean value of food expenditures, it 
predictably reduces the variance (see line cF). 
 
 
Notes:  All reported measures are per adult equivalent and deflated with national monthly CPI.   
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Appendix 3:  Sample Composition 
 
 Full sample 
Restricted 
sample 
Estimation 
sample 
Year:      1994 9.34 9.61 9.66 
1995 8.89 9.09 9.07 
1996 8.82 8.94 8.75 
1998 9.00 9.01 8.91 
2000 9.42 9.24 9.23 
2001 10.64 10.35 10.42 
2002 10.97 10.74 10.81 
2003 11.09 10.92 10.96 
2004 11.07 11.17 11.21 
2005 10.75 10.92 10.99 
Region:  Moscow and St. Petersburg 11.28 11.17 11.31 
North West 6.89 7.33 7.37 
Central 19.09 18.17 18.26 
Volga 17.72 17.42 17.39 
South 11.73 12.13 11.93 
Urals 14.17 14.60 14.59 
Siberia 9.41 9.45 9.41 
Far East 9.71 9.73 9.73 
Number of household members: 1 18.39 7.58 7.18 
2 27.74 24.28 24.16 
3 25.34 30.83 31.07 
4 18.06 23.49 23.72 
5+ 10.47 13.82 13.87 
Number of children <16: None 56.99 45.63 45.25 
1 28.26 35.02 35.32 
2 12.23 15.99 16.09 
3+ 2.53 3.36 3.34 
Urban (excluding small towns) 68.91 69.55 70.01 
 42,541 31,969 31,409 
 
Notes: Restricted sample includes households in which at least one individual is 25-60 years old.  Estimation sample 
includes households with non-missing values on disposable income.  The sample composition is unweighted. 
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Appendix 4:  Inequality over the Life Cycle 
 
The peculiar age-earnings profile for Russian males with its negative experience 
premium (Figure 5C) underscores the importance of investigating the life-cycle pattern of 
inequality.  One would like to separate out the age effect on inequality from time effects and 
cohort effects but these effects are collinear unless one imposes additional restrictions (see 
Heathcote et al 2008).  Since none of the restrictions is entirely satisfactory, we present 
decompositions of age, cohort, and time effects under alternative identifying assumptions.   
Suppose that the cross-sectional inequality moment ( , )M a t  depends on age, a, time, t, 
and cohort effects, at − , through a linear function.  An inequality-age regression can separately 
identify one of these three effects, and the combined effect of the other two.  We first perform 
inequality-age regressions controlling for time effects and assuming that there are no cohort 
effects.  This specification confounds age effects with cohort effects, and the two cannot be 
separately identified.  We regress the inequality moments on the set of age and time dummies: 
,( , ) ( ) ( )a t a ta tM a t D a D tβ β ε= + +∑ ∑ , 
where ( , )M a t  denote the variance of log income (or consumption) within age group a at time t .  
Panel A below shows the pattern of age dummies aβ .  In almost all cases, the age-inequality 
profiles are essentially flat, with the exception of a slight decline in inequality among the oldest 
workers.  The flat life cycle inequality profile can be interpreted as age effects and cohort effects 
roughly canceling each other out. The flat profile of age dummies is consistent with income and 
consumption decompositions in Figures 7 and 10, where age was found to have almost no 
explanatory power.   
Panel B below reports the age coefficients aβ′  from a different specification that assumes 
away time effects and regresses the cross-sectional inequality moments on age and cohort 
dummies: 
,( , ) ( ) ( )a t a a t aa t aM a t D a D t aβ β ε− −−′ ′ ′= + − +∑ ∑ . 
Now the age-inequality profiles are downward-sloping, because time effects are 
confounded with age effects.  In other words, if income and consumption inequality falls over 
time for a fixed cohort, the regression model categorizes this as an age effect.  Our results 
potentially point to large time effects on inequality.  
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Figure A1:  Inequality over the Life Cycle 
 
Notes:  Panel A depicts age profiles for the var-log controlling for year effects.  Panel B depicts age 
profiles for the var-log controlling for cohort effects.  All measures are deflated with national 
monthly CPI.  HH head ec = contractual labor earnings per month of the head of household; yL = 
household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response; yL equiv = yL 
equivalized with an OECD equivalence scale; c equiv = household non-durable expenditures 
equivalized with an OECD equivalence scale.  
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Appendix 5:  Time Series Decomposition of Income and Consumption Growth 
Permanent-temporary decomposition 
The procedure decomposes residual variation of income and consumption ( )shtu  into 
temporary and permanent components, where s denotes a measure of income or consumption.  
Using the notation in the body of the paper, the residual ( )shtu  from regression (1) can be 
decomposed into the sum of a transitory component and a random-walk permanent component: 
( )
, 1
,
,
s
ht ht ht
ht h t ht
u α ε
α α η−
= +
= +  
where 2,~ (0, )ht tεε σ  is the transitory component and 2,~ (0, )ht tηη σ  is the innovation in the 
permanent component.  
Given ( )shtu , we form a vector of changes in the residual  
( )
, 1
s
ht ht ht h tu η ε ε −Δ = + −  (that 
equals the annual growth rate of sht).  The full vector of growth rates for household h and 
measure sht  is  ( ) ( ) ( ),1 ,2 ,[ ... ]
s s s
h h h h Tg u u u ′= Δ Δ Δ , where t = 0 is the first year in the panel and T is the 
last.  The covariance matrix of vector hg , which has ( 1) / 2T T −  unique empirical moments, is   
1
1
( )( )H h hH hV g g g g= ′≡ − −∑  
where 1
1
H
hH h
g g== ∑  is the average value of the change in the residual and H is the number of 
households in the sample. 
Let Λ  be the vector of parameters we to be estimated (i.e., the year-specific variances of 
innovations in permanent and transitory components of sht) and let ( )V Λ  be the corresponding 
covariance matrix.  Under the assumptions of our statistical model,  
2 2 2 2
,1 ,1 ,0 ,1
2 2 2 2 2
,1 ,2 ,2 ,1 ,2
2 2 2 2
,2 ,3 ,3 ,2
2 2 2 2
, 1 , 1 , 2 , 1
2 2 2 2
, 1 , , , 1
0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0
( )
0 0 0
0 0 0
T T T T
T T T T
V
η ε ε ε
ε η ε ε ε
ε η ε ε
η ε ε ε
ε η ε ε
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
− − − −
− −
⎡ ⎤+ + −⎢ ⎥− + + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− + +Λ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ + −⎢ ⎥− + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
L
O
O
M O O O O M
O
O
. 
Two identification issues are apparent from the above expression for ( )V Λ . First, 2,0εσ  is 
not identified separately from 2,1ησ . Second, 2,Tεσ  is not identified separately from 2,Tησ . We 
follow the common practice of addressing these identification issues by imposing 2 2, , 1T Tε εσ σ −=  
and 2 2,1 ,0ε εσ σ= . After imposing these constraints, the vector of parameters to be estimated 
becomes 2 2 2 2 2 2,1 ,2 , 1 ,1 ,2 ,{ , ,..., , , ,..., }T Tε ε ε η η ησ σ σ σ σ σ−Λ =  .  
Vector Λ  is estimated by minimizing the distance between theoretical and empirical 
moments 
ˆ arg max ( { ( )}) ( { ( )}),vech V V vech V VΛ ′Λ = − Λ − Λ  
where the weight matrix is set to be the identity matrix.  
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Estimating consumption response to income innovations 
The approach to estimating the response of consumption to income components is similar 
to that in Blundell et al (2008).  The procedure uses (auto)covariances of income and 
consumption growth rates.  As before, the residual in the income equation is assumed to follow 
the process 
( )
, 1
,
,
y
ht ht ht
ht h t ht
u α ε
α α η−
= +
= +  
The residual consumption growth  
( )
, 1,
c
ht t ht t ht ht h tu φη ψ ε ξ ξ −Δ = + + −  
is decomposed into the parts: the influence of permanent income innovation, the influence of 
temporary income innovation, and unobserved household heterogeneity. Let [ ])( ,)( ,)( 1,)( 1, ,,...,, yThcThyhchh uuuug ΔΔΔΔ=  denote the vector of income and consumption growth rates for 
household h.  As before, define the empirical covariance matrix 
1
1
( )( )H h hH hV g g g g= ′≡ − −∑ . 
Let Λ  be the vector of parameters we to be estimated (i.e., the year-specific variances of 
innovations in permanent and transitory components of income and transitory components in 
consumption as well as loadings tφ  and tψ ) and let ( )V Λ  be the vector of theoretical moments 
(i.e., the model equivalent of V ). Under our statistical model, with T=3 (for example) we have 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,1 ,1 ,0 1 ,1 1 ,1 ,1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 ,1 1 ,1 1 ,1 1 ,1 ,1 ,0 1 ,1 ,1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,1 1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,1 2 ,2 2 ,2 ,2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,1 2 ,2 2 ,2 2 ,2 2
0 0 0
0 0
0
( )
0
V
η ε ε η ε ε
η ε η ε ξ ξ ε ξ
ε ε η ε ε η ε ε
ξ η ε η
σ σ σ φ σ ψ σ σ
φ σ ψ σ φ σ ψ σ σ σ ψ σ σ
σ ψ σ σ σ σ φ σ ψ σ σ
σ φ σ ψ σ φ σ ψ
+ + + −
+ + + + − −
− − + + + −Λ = − + + 2 2 2 2 2 2,2 ,2 ,1 2 ,2 ,2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,2 2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ,2 3 ,3 3 ,3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,2 3 ,3 3 ,3 3 ,3 3 ,3 ,3 ,2
.
0 0
0 0 0
ε ξ ξ ε ξ
ε ε η ε ε η ε
ξ η ε η ε ξ ξ
σ σ σ ψ σ σ
σ ψ σ σ σ σ φ σ ψ σ
σ φ σ ψ σ φ σ ψ σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ + − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎢ ⎥− + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Again, there are two identification issues.  First, 2 2,0 ,0,ε ξσ σ  are not identified separately from 2,1.ησ  
Second, 2 2, ,,T Tε ξσ σ  are not identified separately from 2,Tησ . We impose 2 2, , 1T Tε εσ σ −= , 2 2,1 ,0ε εσ σ= , 
2 2
, , 1T Tξ ξσ σ −= , 2 2,1 ,0ξ ξσ σ= .  Thus, our vector of parameters becomes  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,1 ,2 , 1 ,1 ,2 , ,1 ,2 , 1 1 2 1 2{ , ,..., , , ,..., , , ,..., , , ,..., , , ,..., }T T T T Tε ε ε η η η ξ ξ ξσ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ φ φ φ ψ ψ ψ− −Λ = . 
We estimate Λ  by minimizing the distance between theoretical and empirical moments 
ˆ arg max ( { ( )}) ( { ( )}),vech V V vech V VΛ ′Λ = − Λ − Λ  
where the weight matrix is set to be the identity matrix.  
 
